University of Miami Law Review
Volume 16

Number 3

Article 5

5-1-1962

The Florida Non-Claim Statute
James H. Sweeny III

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
James H. Sweeny III, The Florida Non-Claim Statute, 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 463 (1962)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol16/iss3/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

THE FLORIDA NON-CLAIM STATUTE
INTRODUCTION

Inherent in the settlement of a decedent's estate is the presentation
and, if necessary, the payment of claims and debts outstanding against it.
To deal with this problem, many states, including Florida, have enacted
laws which set out procedures to be followed for the presentation of these
claims. These laws are commonly referred to as non-claim statutes. It is
impossible to formulate a general rule as to the procedures to be followed
in an area in which statutes vary so widely. This comment will attempt to
deal generally with problems which have arisen, or could arise, under the
Florida non-claim statute' and similar enactments. In the absence of statements by the Florida courts bearing upon particular questions, possible
solutions will be suggested based upon decisions rendered in other jurisdictions under similar statutes.
In Florida the personal representative of the estate of a decedent is
required to publish notice of death to the creditors of the estate, once
weekly for four consecutive weeks. 2 Persons with claims against the estate
are then, allowed six months3 from the date of first publication to present
4
their claims.
The statutes further provide that:
No claim or demand, whether due or not, direct or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, or claim for personal property in the
possession of the personal representative or for damages . . . shall
be valid or binding upon an estate . . . unless the same shall be in
writing and contain the place of residence and post office address
of the claimant, and shall be sworn to ... and be filed in the office
of the county judge granting letters. 5
PURPOSE

The non-claim statute has several purposes. One function is to aid in
securing the expeditious settlement of estates,0 or conversely, to provide
1. FLA.

STAT. § 733.16 (1961).
2. FLA. STAT. § 733.15 (1961).
3. This period was reduced from 8 months by a 1961 amendment. Fla. Laws
1961, ch. 61-394, § 3. See In re Woods' Estate, 133 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10 (1938) with

reference to a previous reduction in the time period. This case held that the time period
to be applied was the one in effect at the decedent's death and not the one in effect when
the claim in dispute arose.
4. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1) (1961).
5. Ibid.
6.

ATKINSON, WILLS §

127, at 702 (2d ed. 1953).
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relief against the uncertainty fostered by possible assertion of late claims
against an estate. 7 A further purpose is to provide a means of establishing
the validity of the claims presented. 8 Lastly, in order for a widow to make
an intelligent choice as to whether she should take according to the provisions of her husband's will or elect to take dower in the estate, it is necessary
that she be apprised of all claims against the estate. Under Florida law 9
this choice must be exercised within nine months after first publication of
notice to creditors, or three months after the date that all unfiled claims
become void. Thus, a widow is furnished ample opportunity to weigh and
decide which share should provide her the most advantageous financial
arrangement.
WAIVER OF PRESENTATION

One important problem raised by the statute is: What is required
for presentation of a claim? The statute provides that the claim must be
in writing and filed in the office of the county judge granting letters of
administration. The county judge must then mail a copy of the claim to
the personal representative.10
The decided weight of authority is to the effect that the requirement
of presentation may not be waived by the personal representative."
It
has been held in other jurisdictions that even misleading or fraudulent
conduct on the part of an administrator will not do away with the presentation requirement. Thus, in New Jersey, the recognition of a claim and an
oral agreement by the executor to pay it when there were sufficient funds
available did not negative the requirement of filing.' 2 In Alabama, the
absence of the administrator from the state during the non-claim period,
making presentation impossible,' 3 did not prevent the period from expiring. 1 4 In Missouri, an administrator sent a blank claim form to a creditor
with instructions to complete and retum it. The administrator indicated
that he would perform the filing procedures. Although the administrator
failed to file the claim, the court held his conduct neither waived the requirement for filing nor estopped him from raising the statute as a defense to
the claim. 15

7.

THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES

§ 393 (Woemer & Wislizenus ed. 1913).

8. Schilling v. Biggs, 108 Fla. 351, 146 So. 559 (1933).

9.FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (1961).
10. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1) (c)(1961).

11. In re Erwin's Estate, 117 Cal. App. 2d 203, 255 P.2d 97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953);
In re Duro's Estate, 236 Iowa 165, 18 N.W.2d 199 (1945); Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wash.
2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944).
12. Lewis v. Champion, 40 N.J. Eq. 59 (Ch. 1885).
13. This statute required that presentation be made to the executor. See Branch
Bank v. Donelson, 12 Ala. 741 (1848).
14. Branch Bank v. Donelson, supra note 13.

15. Harrison Mach. Works v. Aufderheide, 280 S.W. 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
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The position of the Florida courts seems to be in accord with the
majority of states with respect to waiver; 16 it has been held that neither
17
the administrator's personal knowledge of the existence of the claim,
nor good faith on the part of the claimant in attempting to comply with
the statute 18 will obviate the necessity of filing.
However, it is evident that a more lenient attitude has been adopted
toward the allowance of claims when some unconscionable conduct can be
found on the part of the personal representative which contributes to the
failure to file the claim. In Adams v. Hackensack Trust Co., 19 the supreme
court found that the conduct of the estate's representatives which led the
claimant to believe that the estate was being administered in a state other
than Florida, and that his claim was properly filed under the laws of the
other state, constituted fraud so as to bar the plea of the non-claim statute
in a court of equity.
Waiver of presentation similarly has been found in cases in which
the executor has paid interest on outstanding obligations of the estate during
the non-claim period. A series of seemingly contrary cases pertaining to this
20
problem has left the law in a state of uncertainty.
In an early case, 2' a complaint was said to state a cause of action
when it set out facts indicating that no claim had been filed within the
statutory period, but that during and for several years after the non-claim
period, payments on the mortgage debt had been made. These facts were
held to demonstrate a sufficient presentation under the statute to withstand a demurrer to the complaint. In the later case of Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Jos6 Lovera, Inc.,22 it was held that the payment
of interest on the debt during the time for filing did not waive the necessity
for filing the claim.
Probably the best reconciliation of these seemingly divergent cases
is found in the rationale of the court in Marshall Lodge No. 39, A.F. 6 A.M.
v. Woodson.23 In this case, suit was filed on a promissory note, presentation of which had not been made. During the non-claim period, an interest
16. American Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 151 Fla. 151, 9 So.2d 355 (1942); In re Woods'
Estate, 133 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10 (1938); In re Williamson's Estate, 95 So.2d 244 (Fla.
App. 1957).
17. Van Sciver v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 88 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1956).
18. In re Woods' Estate, 133 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10 (1938).
19. 156 Fla. 20, 22 So.2d 392 (1945).
20. For cases which appear to stand for the proposition that payment of interest
amounts to a waiver of presentation, see State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co. v. Macy, 101
Fla. 140, 133 So. 876 (1931); Tucker v. First Nat'l Bank, 98 Fla. 914, 124 So. 464
(1929). But cf., Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Jose Lovera, Inc., 125 Fla.
682, 171 So. 512 (1936); Brooks v. Federal Land Bank, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749 (1932).
21. Miller v. Crosby, 68 Fla. 365, 67 So. 76 (1914).
22. 125 Fla. 682, 171 So. 512 (1936).
23. 139 Fla. 579, 190 So. 749 (1939).
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payment had been made on the note. The court discussed the several
conflicting cases and reconciled them by saying that the problem in each
case is whether the payment of interest is made in recognition of the debt
(in which case presentation is waived), or is made simply for the purpose
of deferring institution of suit. Thus it would appear that although there
is much language to the contrary, waiver is a question of the intent of the
administrator in each case.
This rule, perhaps, has been carried beyond its logical terminus in
the recent case of Davis v. Evans.2 4 In this case a negligence action was
commenced against the decedent while he was still living. The complaint,
however, inadvertently misnamed the defendant. 21 Shortly thereafter the
defendant died and, without informing the plaintiff of the death, the
decedent's attorney filed an answer using the incorrect name. Subsequent
to the expiration of the non-claim period, the attorneys for the estate filed
a suggestion of death and the additional defense of failure to present the
claim. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, but
this ruling was reversed on appeal. The court held that the continuation
of the case under the incorrect name and the failure to inform the plaintiff
of the defendant's death disclosed "the existence of a genuine controversy
upon the material question of whether the defendant's executor is estopped
to assert the failure of plaintiff to comply with the non-claim statute
....- 26 While it cannot be denied that this decision is an equitable one
for the plaintiff, an incongruity is apparent since the advantage of this
estoppel was gained by the plaintiff's negligence in filing suit in the wrong
name. This case reflects a greatly increased liberality toward allowance of
claims against estates. Whether it is indicative of a trend in Florida, or is
only an isolated instance which will not be followed, is a question that
remains unanswered. It is submitted that a slightly more restrictive attitude
toward these claims would be more in keeping with the purpose of the
statute.
MANNER OF PRESENTATION

The common law rule in Florida regarding the filing of suit as a means
of presentation was expressed in Jones v. Allen.2 7 In this case an action
for personal injuries was brought against an administrator within the nonclaim period. Shortly after the period expired, the administrator interposed
the additional defense of failure to make timely presentation in accordance
with the provisions of the statute. The plaintiff argued that his actions
constituted sufficient compliance with the statute to validate the claim.
24. 132 So.2d 476 (Fla. App. 1961).
25. The complaint was filed in the name of Anderson Willie Phillips instead of
the correct name which was Anderson Woody Phillips.
26. Davis v.Evans, 132 So.2d 476, 483 (Fla. App. 1961).
27. 134 Fla. 751, 184 So. 651 (1938).
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The court said that presentation in this manner would not be consistent
with the stated purpose of the statute, i.e., the expeditious disposition of
28
estates, and held the claim void.
The non-claim statute was amended in 194729 to overcome this decision
by. providing that if suit is filed and service of process perfected against
the personal representative of an estate within the statutory period, the
claim will not be impaired for failure to file it. 3° However, the claimant
will be precluded from recovering any costs and attorney's fees incurred as
31
an incident to the suit.
One exception to the statute is that a suit commenced against a person
who subsequently dies will be honored though no formal presentation is
made within the non-claim period, provided the executor is substituted as
32
party defendant in place of the decedent.
The exact procedure for presentation as dictated by the statute is
in some respects no more than a directory requirement, and' strict compliance is not always necessary. For example, in Ramsever v. Datson33 a
claim was presented directly to the executor of an estate within the statutory
time. However, the claim was not filed in the county judge's court as
required by the statute. The executor neither denied nor contested the
claim within the statutory period. The failure to comply with the statute
was raised as a defense subsequent to the expiration of the time period.
The supreme court held that, with regard to uncontested claims, presentation
directly to the executor is sufficient. The court did say by way of dicta
that a different result might obtain if the claim were contested. 34
NON-CLAIM

STATUTE

DISTINcUISHED

FROM

STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS

While the non-claim statute appears to be simply another name for a
statute of limitations and courts often treat it as such, there is a valid
distinction between them. A statute of limitations is purely mechanical
in its operation. It commences to run on the accrual of a cause of action
and, subject to certain factors which may temporarily toll its running,

28. Ibid.
29. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23970, § 1(a), at 742 (now
(1961)).

FLA. STAT. §' 733.16(1)(a)

30. This view appears to be followed by the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States. Federal Land Bank v. Ditto, 227 Iowa 475, 288 N.W. 618 (1939); Barton v.
Harmon, 207 Okla. 197, 248 P.2d 601 (1952); Carroll v. Eblen, 178 Tenn. 146, 156

S.W.2d 412 (1941).

§ 733.16(l)(a) (1961).
32. Schilling v. Biggs, 108 Fla. 351, 146 So. 559 (1933).
31. FLA. STAT.

33. 120 Fla. 414, 162 So. 904 (1935).

34. "Where a claim is denied . . . the effect of [the non-claim statute] . . . is

undoubtedly to make it obligatory that the denied or disputed claim be thereupon sworn to
and filed with the county judge ....
" Id. at 420, 162 So. at 906.
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extinguishes the cause of action when the limitation period has expired.
While the effect of the statute of non-claim may be quite similar, its purpose
is to establish certain procedures which must be followed by a claimant
to give force and effect to his claim,3 5 rather than to lessen the time
within which an action may be brought. This is seen in that the commencement of the period in which claims may be presented has no relation
to the accrual of the cause of action. Further, the claimant is always in
direct control of whether or not the procedures are followed.
In the case of a general statute of limitations, the day on which the
cause of action arose is not counted.3 6 It has been held under a statute
of non-claim similar to Florida's, in which the period of time commences
to run on the publication of notice, that the day of publication is counted.37
Although no case has ruled directly on the point, it would appear that there
is no objection to extending the time period an additional day if the
terminal date falls on Sunday or on a holiday.38
A further distinguishing feature of the non-claim statute in Florida
is that, in the absence of a specific statutory provision raising disabilities,3 9
it runs against all persons including those under an otherwise legal disability. 40 Thus, the statute of non-claim has been held to run against
43
infants, 41 insane people 42 and married women.
While some might argue that these distinctions are superficial since
the ultimate result in both cases is the same, it would seem that the point
is sufficiently cogent to merit more than a cursory treatment when it arises.
CONTINGENT CLAIMS

When a creditor has a liquidated and mature debt against a person
at the time of his death, no problem would seem to arise in presenting the
claim. However, as seen from the statute, not only are matured claims
required to be presented, but also unmatured and contingent ones.
A contingent claim has been defined as "one where the liability depends
upon some future event, which may or may not happen, which renders
it uncertain whether there will ever be a liability. '4 4 While to hold that
35.
36.
37.
(1934).
38.

See Toney v. Adair, 120 So.2d 622 (Fla. App. 1960).
McMillen v. Hamilton, 48 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1950).
First-Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbeli, 217 Iowa 624, 252 N.W. 769
O'Brien v. Wilson, 26 N.M. 641, 195 Pac. 803 (1921).

39. Florida at one time had such a provision (see

(1914)),
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

FLA. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 2405
but it was repealed.
Brooks v. Federal Land Bank, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749 (1932).
Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, 178 Tenn. 179, 156 S.W.2d 425 (1940).
Rowell v. Patterson, 76 Me. 196 (1884).
Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 107 N.W. 488 (1906).
American Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 151 Fla. 151, 158, 9 So.2d 355, 357 (1942).
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these claims need not be presented would do obvious violence to the
purposes of the statute, it can be seen from this definition that the act
is quite encompassing and a claim could easily be lost by even a prudent
creditor.
The harshness of this requirement is exemplified in American Sur.
Co. v. Murphy.45 The surety on a replevin bond failed to file a claim
against the estate, since the decedent was solvent at the time of his death.
Some two years later, however, the surety was forced to pay the bond. The
court held that the surety had no recourse against the estate, since he failed
46
to file notice of the claim.
Another example of a contingent claim may be found in Fowler v.
Hartridge.47 In this case, the plaintiff was the lessor of business premises
under a ninety-nine year lease which was binding on the decedent-lessee's
executors and assigns. The decedent's family continued to maintain the
property and make rental payments for nine years. Subsequently, they
refused to continue the rental payments. The court held that the plaintiff's
failure to present the claim within the non-claim period precluded his action
against the estate for breach of the leasehold agreement.
Some states have met the inequities which spring from this rule by
providing that contingent claims need not be filed until a specified time
after they mature. 48 Perhaps the most desirable method for dealing with
claims of this nature is Professor Atkinson's suggestion to eliminate entirely
the requirement of presentation. Instead, he would permit recovery against
the legatee or devisee who holds the decedent's property at the time the
claim becomes absolute. 49 Recovery should, of course, be limited to the
amount of the decedent's property then in the hands of the beneficiary.
CLAIMS THAT NEED NOT BE PRESENTED

a. Government
Some claims which fall, or seem to fall, within the definition of the
act have been held to be valid though not presented. The rule is well
settled that the non-claim statute has no applicability to claims of the
United States Government.5" The landmark decision is United States v.
45. SuPra note 44.
46. It has been held in other jurisdictions that a surety who pays a debt of the
decedent may avail himself of the prior presentation by the creditor. Braught v. Griffith,
16 Iowa 26 (1864); Gilbert v. Garber, 62 Neb. 464, 87 N.W. 179 (1901).
47. 156 Fla. 585, 24 So.2d 306 (1945).
48. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. § 62-2610b. (Supp. 1961) interpreted in Whitener v.
Whitener, 227 Ark. 1038, 1041, 304 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1957).
49. ATKINSON, WILLS § 127, at 702 (2d. ed. 1953).
50. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); United States v. Embrey, 145
Fla. 277, 199 So. 41 (1940).
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Summerlin, 1' in which a claim was filed on behalf of the Federal Housing
Administration against an estate subsequent to the expiration of the
non-claim period. The administrator of the estate argued that the Florida
statute of non-claim was not a statute of limitations, but merely a procedure
prescribed for the prompt and orderly settlement of estates. The United
States Supreme Court held that irrespective of the purpose of the statute,
to the extent that it limited the time in which a suit could be brought by
or on behalf of the federal government, it was an overstepping of state
52
powers.
This rule has been extended in more recent cases to apply not only to
suits on behalf of the government, but also to rights of action created by
federal statutes. In Cox v. Roth1a the Supreme Court held that a judgment recovered under the Jones Act14 was not barred against the defendant's
estate for failure to give timely notice of the claim to the administrator. A
state legislature cannot diminish the limitation period prescribed by Congress
for a federally created claim. This decision makes no attempt to consider
the distinction between a statute of limitations and one of non-claim and
frustrates the purpose of the non-claim statute.
In the recent Florida case of Riza v. Estate of Riza,5 5 a different result
was reached with regard to claims of the United States Government with
respect to insurance proceeds of a decedent. The decedent died intestate,
leaving an unpaid federal gift tax. After the non-claim period had expired,
the government petitioned the court for payment of the tax from the
proceeds of the decedent's insurance. The district court of appeal held that
the effect of Florida law 5 6 was to pass title to the insurance proceeds
directly to the heirs of the deceased. Thus, the money never became an
asset of the estate. The government was precluded from recovering its
claim from the insurance proceeds. It was, of course, allowed to recover
what assets it could from the balance of assets left in the estate under the
5T
rule of the Summerlin case.
Whether the state of Florida is barred by the statute for failure to
make timely assertion of its claims has been decided directly in only one
case. In Munro v. Bechard58 a claim against the decedent's estate by the
Florida Industrial Commission was held to be barred for failure of the

51. Supra note 50.
52. Ibid.

53. 348 U.S. 207 (1955).
54. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
55. 132 So.2d 308 (Fla. App. 1961).

56. FLA. STAT. § 222.13 (1961). "Whenever any person shall die in this state
leaving insurance on his life, the said insurance shall inure exclusively to the benefit of the
surviving child or children and husband or wife of such person in equal portions.
57. United States v. Suinmerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
58. 132 So.2d 429 (Fla. App. 1961).
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agency to make timely presentation of the claim. This case follows what
might be considered the majority view as to the applicability of non-claim
statutes to state governments.5 9 However, it conflicts with dicta of an
older supreme court case. In Heidt v. Caldwell6" the court stated quite
simply that "the language of this section [the non-claim statute] is not
made applicable to the state of Florida."'6 1 This statement, of course,
is in no way controlling on the courts in this state, and it would seem that
the sounder principle is that espoused in the more recent Munro case. It
is submitted that there is no reason why the state government should be
allowed to prejudice the rights of heirs and other beneficiaries under a
will, or to circumvent the policies and purposes of the statute. If it fails
to make a timely presentation, its claim should be lost.
b. Mortgage Claims
At common law, the failure to file notice of a mortgage claim would
bar any suit against the estate, including one to foreclose on the mortgaged
property.6 2 This rule was in force at a time when there was a non-claim
statute in effect.63 However, no specific statutory provision existed with
respect to these claims. The Florida Probate Act of 193364 introduced
a proviso in the statute that any claim of a duly recorded mortgage or of
a lien on personal property not in the hands of the claimant must be
presented if a deficiency decree is to be entered.
Therefore, the rule today is that even without filing notice of the
mortgage claim, the mortgagee will always have recourse to foreclosure on
the encumbered property. This, combined with the rule which requires
notice to be given in order to validate the claim on the mortgage note, has
led to some rather interesting decisions.
For instance, if a mortgage is executed by a married couple on homestead property, the remainder rights of their children may be extinguished
in a foreclosure proceeding.65 However, if the husband dies, the indebtedness becomes a claim which should be satisfied from the assets of his
estate, without recourse to the mortgaged property. 66 This situation has
59. State v. Crocker's Estate, 38 Ala. 306, 83 So.2d 261 (1955); In re Ashing's
Estate, 250 Iowa 259, 93 N.W.2d 587 (1958); Reith v. County of Mountrail, 104
N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1960).
60. 41 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1949).
61. Id. at 305.
62. Brooks v. Federal Land Bank, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749 (1932).
63. FLA. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 2398, 2405 (1914).
64. Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16103. The specific provision is now FLA. STAT. §

733.16(1) (b) (1961).

65. "Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent the holder of a homestead
from alienating his or her homestead so exempted by deed or mortgage duly executed by
himself or herself, and by husband and wife, if such relation exists .
FLA. CONST. art.

10, § 4.
66. See In re Comstock's Estate, 143 Fla. 500, 197 So. 121 (1940).
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given rise to the anomalous result that the failure of the mortgagee to
present his claim will absolve the estate completely, yet subject the homestead property to foreclosure proceedings, effectively defeating all rights
67
of the remaindermen
An attempt by the remaindermen to file notice on behalf of the
mortgagee to preserve their interest in the homestead has been held ineffective.68 Even when the mortgage claim is filed, if it is later withdrawn,
the mortgagee must look to the encumbered property for recovery, and the
estate is not liable for the debt. 9 Since a mortgage is primarily a personal
debt, the proper procedure would seem to require satisfaction of the claim
from the general assets of the estate without recourse to the mortgaged
property. However, Florida courts have reasoned that a mortgagee need not
seek satisfaction from the assets of the estate, but may choose to rely solely
on the encumbered property. This choice is his alone to make, and the
executor's knowledge of the claim, or its presentation by another, in no
way serves to reflect the mortgagee's choice. The validity of this reasoning
breaks down, however, when it is remembered that the presentation of the
claim in no way prejudices the mortgagee's right to proceed against the
70
property itself if the estate is insufficient to satisfy the debt.
The decisions in these cases can be criticized for two reasons. First the
requirement of a presentation by the claimant alone is, in effect, a holding
that form governs over substance, a conclusion which is not supported by
the previously discussed cases bearing on this problem. 71 Secondly, it
does work some degree of prejudice to the homestead remaindermen. It
would seem that at least to the extent that substantial compliance is made
with the statute, i.e., the administrator is apprised of the claim by a formal
presentation from any interested party, the mortgagee should be made to
proceed first against the assets of the estate. In this way, the purpose of
the statute will be fulfilled.
c. Property Held in Trust
It is a well established principle that a claim for property held in trust
by the decedent need not be presented. 72 The reason for this is that trust

1960).

67. In re Comstock's Estate, supra note 66.
68. Furlong v. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 So.2d 797 (Fla. App.

69. In re Simpson's Estate, 113 So.2d 766 (Fla. App 1959).
70. "We find the general rule is that a mortgagee filing claim against an estate does
not waive his right to enforce the mortgage lien." Id. at 768.
71. See discussion of Ranseyer v. Datson in the text accompanying note 33 supra and
the discussion of Starke v. Pfender in the text accompanying note 78 infra.
72. Hodges v. Logan, 82 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1955); Sewell v. Sewell Properties, 159
Fla. 570, 30 So.2d 361 (1947); Cooey v. Cooey, 132 Fla, 716, 182 So. 202 (1938);

Tibbetts Comer v. Arnold, 108 Fla. 239, 146 So. 218 (1933); 2
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA §

REDFEARN, WILLS AND

285, at 531 (3d ed. 1957).
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property does not become an asset of the decedent's estate on his death. 73
One exception to this rule might be found in the case of a trust corpus
which cannot be traced or adequately separated from the balance of the
deceased's assets. Under these circumstances, it might be wise for the
cestui que trust to file his claim notwithstanding the rules or theories
74
to the contrary.
d. Replevin and Ejectment
The claim of a person to replevy property,75 and probably a claim
sounding in ejectment,7 6 need not be presented. The reason for this is
closely analogous to the absence of a requirement for presentation of
claims for trust property. In these actions, the claimant seeks recovery
on a title superior to that of the estate. When the claimant prevails, it is
on the strength of his better title. To hold that he was barred from
recovering his property for failing to present his claim would be, in effect,
a change in the property ownership by reason of the non-claim statute. This
77
result obviously was not intended.
Starke v. Pfender78 indicates that Florida will look to the purposes of
the act to determine if the requirement of presentation will be imposed.
In this case, the plaintiff sued to cancel a mortgage on property, an act
which the decedent had agreed to do in exchange for food and lodging
to be provided by the plaintiff. The court pointed out that the purpose of
the act was not only to expedite settlement of estates, but also to protect
the rights of creditors. The right of the mortgagor was in the nature of a
defense to a foreclosure action and, thus, not a claim requiring presentation.
CONCLUSION

It cannot be gainsaid that the non-claim statute serves a utilitarian
purpose in the law of estate administration. Florida courts have, for the
most part, sensibly interpreted the act. If the constructions of the statute
are tempered with reason, and it is not used as an absolute rule to invalidate
otherwise just claims, the non-claim statute will ably serve its purpose.
JAMES H. SWEENY, III

73. See Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1957).
74. See Cooey v. Cooey, 132 Fla. 716, 182 So. 202 (1938).
75. Moore v. Moore, 141 Miss. 795, 105 So. 850 (1925).
76. ATKINSON, WILLS § 127, at 697 (2d ed. 1953).
77. But see, In re Del Paronto's Estate, 172 Kan. 7, 238 P.2d 464 (1951) in which
replevin of a ring was denied for failure to file a claim.
78. 146 Fla. 262, 200 So. 850 (1941).

